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Abstract—State-of-the-art drone technologies have severe flight
time limitations due to weight constraints, which inevitably lead
to a relatively small amount of available energy. Therefore,
frequent battery replacement or recharging is necessary in appli-
cations such as delivery, exploration, or support to the wireless
infrastructure. Mobile charging stations (i.e., mobile stations with
charging equipment) for outdoor ad-hoc battery charging is one
of the feasible solutions to address this issue. However, the ability
of these platforms to charge the drones is limited in terms of
the number and charging time. This paper designs an auction-
based mechanism to control the charging schedule in multi-
drone setting. In this paper, charging time slots are auctioned,
and their assignment is determined by a bidding process. The
main challenge in developing this framework is the lack of
prior knowledge on the distribution of the number of drones
participating in the auction. Based on optimal second-price-
auction, the proposed formulation, then, relies on deep learning
algorithms to learn such distribution online. Numerical results
from extensive simulations show that the proposed deep learning-
based approach provides effective battery charging control in
multi-drone scenarios.
Index Terms—Auction, Deep learning, Charging, Drone net-
works, Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
I. INTRODUCTION
The possibility to use commercial drones in a broad range
of applications is being extensively studied by the research
community, and they are expected to manned operations in
remote locations [1]. In general, commercial drones have
inherent limitations in the amount of energy available to
support their operations. This is due to the energy/weight ratio
of current energy storage technologies, where increasing the
capacity of the battery beyond a certain point degrades flight
time due to excessive weight.
As a consequence, effective battery management is one of
the main enablers of practical deployments of drone-based
technologies and applications. Importantly, in applications re-
quiring extensive flight time, the energy constraint problem can
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Fig. 1: Multi-drone network model for mobile charging sta-
tions.
not be solved by only optimizing power consumption. Thus,
charging during the completion of long-term tasks has been
proposed to extend the operational range of the drones [1],
[2]. There are several ways to powering the drones which
have been proposed in the literature. We can divide them
into two main classes: (i) harvesting energy directly from
the surrounding environment, and (ii) taking energy from an
electrical source such as a charging station [2]. Within the
latter class of approaches, the charging stations can be either
stationary or mobile. However, solutions based on stationary
charging stations may constrain the geographical area of
operations around specific locations. In order to deal with this
issue, mobile charging stations can be used although they face
other challenges [2]. As they are mobile, the size of these
charging stations needs to be comparably smaller to that of
fixed stations. As a consequence, the capacity of the system
has limitations, leading to relatively low chargin speeds and
a relatively smaller number of drones that can be charged
simultaneously [2], [3].
Motivated by this compelling problem, we consider a sce-
nario where multiple drones compete to access the services
provided by a mobile charging station (see Fig. 1). The frame-
work proposed in this paper controls the charging process of
the drones, where the charging station takes the role of leader
in the distributed drone-charging system, and coordination
within the system is supported by Internet-of-Vehicle (IoV)
networking functions [4]–[6].
We take an econometric approach, where the problem of
controlling the scheduling is formulated as an auction, whose
objective is to maximize the utility of the drones (i.e., the
difference between payment and bid during auction computa-
tion) as well as the station’s revenue (i.e., payment received
by the drones through charging scheduling). In general auction
problems, buyers (the drones in this system) bid to access
services periodically auctioned by a seller (the mobile charging
station in the considered setting). The value of the bid is
individually, and privately, estimated by each drone based
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2on the urgency of its charging needs. The auction approach
is especially useful when there is no accurate estimation
of the buyer’s true valuation, and buyers are not aware of
the private true values of other buyers. In the drone net-
work model considered herein, the drones are assumed to
be non-cooperative, that is, they operate independently and
distributely. Furthermore, the mobile charging station is not
assumed to know the exact true values associated with each
drone, which became available only when the actual values
are submitted. The auction approach we take is especially
suitable to solve the problem of assigning time slots to drones
in this information-limited system. Among the various auction
formulations available (e.g., ascending auction, descending
auction, first price auction, second price auction), we choose
a second price auction formulation, where the highest bidder
wins but the price paid is set to the second highest bid. One of
the main benefits of the second price auction is that it results
in a truthful auction process.
In the considered system model, the mobile station is
the auctioneer and owner/seller of the resource (that is, the
charging time slot) and each drone is considered as a buyer.
The drones are in competition for scheduling battery charging
with price bidding via its own private valuation for auction.
As auctioneer, the mobile station (i) receives all bids from the
drones, (ii) calculates the charging time allocation probabilities
and payments, (iii) assigns the charging time to the drone
(i.e., the winner in auction) who bids the highest value, corre-
sponding to the largest allocation probability, (iv) announces
the value which should be paid by the winner drone, and (v)
receives the payment.
During the auction, drones strategically submit bids to
increase their profits, i.e., utility. Similarly, the resource-owned
auctioneer is not a sacrificial seller, thus it is required to
consider the revenue in auctioneer, i.e., profitable. Therefore,
revenue-optimal auctions have been considered as one of
major objectives in auction design. Although there are many
variants already available in the literature auction theory, the
problem of simultaneously optimizing auctioneer’s revenue
and buyers utility is still open [7]–[10]. Among various
auction algorithms, Myerson auction is one of the most ef-
ficient revenue-optimal single-item auctions [11]. The auction
transforms the bid value, and then winner and payment is
determined based on the transformed bid. At that point, if
the transformation function is monotonic, the revenue-optimal
auction is configured. Therefore, the proposed auction designs
the revenue-optimal auction based on the concept of the
Myerson auction.
However, it is difficult to apply the existing auction as it
is in the distributed drone network environment considered
in this paper. The charging scheduling system of the drones
is still in the early stages of research; and key properties of
the system such as drones location distribution and residual
energy distribution have not been fully characterized in the
literature. Therefore, a system that can extract the desired data
(i.e., distribution of drones), from the actual system without
prior knowledge or assumptions is desirable. Therefore, this
paper takes advantage of deep learning to learn important
features on-the-fly from the operating environment. Recently,
frameworks combining game theory and deep learning have
been active subject of research [12], [13]. Results illustrate
applications of such approach in various domains [14]–[16].
The key is that deep learning can automatically extract and
learn important features from data, and it has been widely
demonstrated that neural network structures can approximate
complex non-linear functions [17]–[19]. In this paper, we use
this feature to approximate some key – monotonic – functions
governing the behavior of the system using relatively simple
neural networks [16]. Specifically, we use deep learning to
learn the features necessary for the virtual transformation
step of Myerson auctions. Then, the proposed auction is
configured by replacing the trained deep learning network with
a virtual transformation function. We remark that the functions
to be learn by the deep learning layer is non-decreasing
monotonic [11].
The proposed deep learning network uses the ReLU (acti-
vation function) and softmax (classification function) which
are widely used in optimization procedures. In addition, due
to the fact that the operations mostly amount to linear multi-
plications, the proposed approach has low complexity, and its
execution takes a limited amount of time.
Contributions. Our proposed auction-based charging schedul-
ing algorithm makes the following contributions. First, the
revenue of auctioneer is considered even if the drones submit
false/fake bids, i.e., thus the proposed algorithm is self-
configurable and truthful. The proposed auction automatically
learns environmental features. In distributed drone scenarios,
various time varying features exist that make self-configurable
nature essential to adapt to different scenarios and environ-
ments. The proposed deep learning based auction structure is
simple to be implemented and imposes a small computation
burden.
Organization. The rest of this paper is organized as follows.
Sec. II discusses related work, and then Sec. III describes the
auction-based mobile charging model. In Sec. IV, the deep
learning based approach is presented. In Sec. V, performance
evaluation results are presented. Sec. VI concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
There have been several research results to solve limited-
battery and limited resource scheduling problems through
auctions [1], [2], [20], [21]. The method in [1] aims at
optimizing battery assignment and drone scheduling, assuming
that the battery can be quickly replaced. The joint assignment
and scheduling problem is formulated as a two-stage problem,
where the assignment problem is solved by a heuristic and
the scheduling problem is formulated as an integer-linear
programming (ILP) problem. This paper proposes the schedul-
ing algorithm based on auction. The proposed method uses
information provided by drones capable of communicating
with mobile charging stations to overcome the inability of a
central service provider to acquire perfect state information
in a distributed drone network. However, a solution based on
battery assignment necessarily maps to a stationary service sta-
tion. This imposes some limitations [2], which are mitigated
when using mobile charging stations.
3In [2], a systems of mobile robots executing a trans-
portation task supported by a charging station is considered.
The location of the charging station is a major factor in
determining the operations and performance of the robots, and
the paper assumes that the mobile charging station is itself
an autonomous robot that attempts to incrementally improve
its location. Although this work considers a mobile charging
station, the problem of charging scheduling is not considered.
In a more general scenario, the resources of the charging
station are limited and the number of robots to be charged
may be larger than the actual charging capacity of the station.
Therefore, the charging system will need to implement forms
of prioritization to optimize the charging process. The method
proposed herein incorporates a notion of priority using an
auction formulation based on the valuation of the drones.
In [20], an auction mechanism is proposed to solve a
resource allocation problem in a distributed computing system.
The inherently distributed nature of the system makes the
resolution of the problem much harder. The paper proposes
an auction-based solution to address such challenge. The pro-
posed mechanism is configured as a two auction mechanism,
used to compute optimal solutions at the single unit within
the distributed scheduling problem in a computationally effi-
cient manner. However, [20] assumes prior knowledge of the
environment where the auction mechanism is executed, which
may limit its application in real-world distributed scenarios.
The method we propose herein uses an auction-based solution
to solve the resource allocation problem, and employs deep
learning to extract the required features automatically from
the environment, so that prior knowledge is not necessary.
The method in [21] addresses a distributed train scheduling
problem using an auction method. The determination of the
winner is formulated as a mixed-integer problem. The bidding
strategy of the buyers is solved via dynamic programming.
In the proposed method, the auctioneer computes the set of
bids that maximizes revenue. Both the method proposed in
[21] and the one proposed in this paper are based on an
auction formulation to effectively solve resource scheduling
in distributed environments and maximize the revenue of the
auctioneer. However, the method in [21] differs from the
proposed deep learning based auction in terms of the required
prior information to conduct the auction. The deep learning-
based auction proposed in this paper only requires limited
information since as it can learn in real-time environmental
characteristics and parameters.
III. CHARGING SCHEDULING MECHANISM DESIGN
Drone Network Model. The system is composed of the
mobile charging station S and U drones1. The mobile station
is governed by the charging service controller; and the service
controller collects revenue by providing charging services. The
revenue of the charging service controller is recorded and will
be requested later to be paid to drone operators. This paper
assumes that the mobile station can provide charging service
to only one drone in each time slot. Thus, drones competes to
1The notation used in this paper is summarized in Table I.
TABLE I: Notations
Variables Descriptions
U The number of drones
S Mobile charging station
B Bid profiles
Bt t-th bid profile
ui i-th user
ci Maximum battery capacity of ui
ri Remaining battery capacity of ui
ei Average amperage draw of ui
hi Battery discharge of ui
f Charging rate per unit time
ti Scheduled charging time to ui
qi Amount of energy charged of ui
li Flight time with current battery of ui
vi The valuation of ui
bi The bid of ui
bi The transformed bid of ui
gi Allocation probability of ui
pi The virtual payment of ui
pi Actual payment of ui
φi The forward transformation function for ui
wig,n Weight of g-th group, n-th unit for ui
wsharedg,n Weight of g-th group, n-th unit of phi
shared
βig,n Bias of g-th group, n-th unit for ui
βsharedg,n Bias of g-th group, n-th unit of phi
shared
ui The utility of ui
G The number of groups in network
N The number of units in group
R The number of epoch
T The number of bid sets
obtain charging opportunities. Note that we consider a short-
range Internet of Vehicles (IoV) multi-drone network support-
ing short-distance communications among drones based on
IEEE 802.11-based wireless local area network (WLAN) tech-
nologies. Therefore, the size of the network composed of one
single mobile charging station and multiple drones is relatively
small, and we assume that the flight time from drones’ current
positions to the mobile charging station is negligible. Thus,
unexpected operational problems due to the delay induced by
long flight time toward the mobile charging station are not
considered in this paper. Furthermore, we note that the specific
design, system capabilities and state of the drones participating
in the auction can vary in terms of battery capacity, residual
battery, charging rates and so forth. Formally, each drone ui
is characterized by the battery capacity ci, average amperage
draw ei, and battery residual charge hi, which determines the
mission lifetime. The average amperage draw ei denotes the
amount of amperage required to the drone to operate on-board
systems such as motors, embedded computers, sensors, etc.
Each drone continuously monitors its own state and requests
the scheduling of a charging slot to the mobile station if
needed.
The requests from multiple drones to the mobile station for
charging services can be interpreted as a distributed competi-
tion for a limited resource, which here is modeled and solved
using an auction-based approach. In the considered setting, the
auctioneer is the mobile station, which is also the owner and
provider of the resource, and the drones are the buyers.
The mobile station and drones exchange information, i.e.,
bids and other auction variables, over wireless links. The
mobile station announces the start of the auction to the drones
4Fig. 2: Auction procedure.
when the charging system is ready to serve (i.e., idle). Upon
reception of the announcement, each drone makes its own
private, and independent, valuation for the use of the charging
system. The private valuation vi of drone ui is used to compete
for the charging service. Note that the charging resource is
assigned at the granularity of individual time slots as illustrated
in Fig 2. The mobile station S sells the charging service and
obtains revenue pi paid by the winner drone ui via auction.
Drone Scheduling Auction Design. We use second price auc-
tion (SPA) as a baseline to design the auction in the considered
setting. In SPA, all buyers submit their bids privately. The
auctioneer receives the sealed bids and selects as winner the
buyer who made the highest bid. The amount paid by the
winner is set to be equal to the second highest bid value.
Herein, the problem of assigning slots to drones is formulated
as a single item auction based on SPA. Therefore, drones
compete for one item, i.e., the charging service. Since the
proposed approach is based on SPA, it is guaranteed that
the charging service will be assigned to the drone with the
highest valuation to the service [22]–[24]. Myerson presents
provable analytical results for single item auctions optimizing
the auctioneer revenue where each buyer has its own private
valuation of the resource [11], [18].
When the auction-based mechanism is designed, it is im-
portant to let the participants act truthfully to ensure system
stability [11], [18], [19], [25]–[27]. Previous studies attempted
to achieve this objective by enforcing truthfulness to individual
participants. The concepts such as incentive compatibility
(IC) and individual rationality (IR) are the characteristics of
auctions inducing the truthful action of participants. Based on
this approach, we use a Myerson auction where the following
characteristic is used as the baseline mechanism: The Myerson
auction guarantees dominant strategy incentive compatibility
(DSIC) and IR.
Definition 1. (Incentive Compatibility [28]) Incentive com-
patibility is defined by the following property: if for every
bidder j, every valuation vj , all declarations of the other
bidders v−j , and all possible ”false declarations” v′j , we
have that bidder j’s utility with bidding v′j is no more than
his utility with bidding the truth vj . Formally, let λj and
Pj be the mechanism ’s output with input (vj , v−j) and λ′j
and P ′j be the mechanism’s output with input (v
′
j , v−j), then
vj(λj)− Pj > vj(λ′j)− P ′j .
Thus, this weaker degree of DSIC guarantees IC, where
IC means that the utility a participant can obtain by acting
truthfully is greater than that by fake acting according to
Definition 1.
Definition 2. (Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibility)
Dominant strategy incentive compatibility is defined as the
following property. For each bidder i, and for every possible
report of the other bidders bid b−i, bidder i weakly maximizes
utility by reporting bi = vi. That is, for all possible reports
b∗i , ui(vi, b−i) ≥ ui(b∗i , b−i).
Thus, the DISC is a stronger degree of IC, meaning that
a truthful action is a weakly dominant strategy, that is, the
action is guaranteed to be the best, regardless of the actions
of others, as shown in Definition 2.
Definition 3. (Individual Rationality) Individual rationality
(IR) is defined by the following property: for every bidder
i and for every vi, we have vi ≥ pi, that is, no bidder is ever
asked to pay more than its bid valuation.
In a DSIC and IR auction, it is in the best interest of
each bidder to report truthfully. Therefore, these characteristics
make the overall auction truthful. The Myerson auction guar-
antees DSIC and IR, thus encouraging the bidders to report
truthfully [11], [18]. Furthermore, the Myerson auction also
guarantees auctioneer’s revenue optimality. In the considered
drone network model, we remark that the charging service
controller obtains revenue by providing charging services. The
following subsections describe in detail the components of the
Myerson auction mechanism, i.e., private valuation, allocation
rule, payment rule, reserve price, utility, and auction design.
Private Valuation. In the proposed auction, each drone ui
has its own individual private valuation vi. Each drone ui has
an maximum battery capacity (denoted by ci) and a current
remaining battery (denoted by ri). If the drone is assigned
the mobile charging service time slot, the charged energy will
be added to the residual energy in its own battery ri. The
amount of energy charged by the mobile charging station S
can be expressed as qi = min(f · ti, (ci − ri)) where f is the
charging rate per unit of time in the mobile charging station.
The scheduled charging time to ui via auction is denoted by
ti. t denotes the item being sold by auction, i.e., charging time.
The higher f · t, the higher the valuation of t by drone ui, and
the drone is willing to pay a higher amount for the charging
service. The expected drone flight time with current battery
status is denoted as li, calculated as li = ri·hiei . If li is larger,
the drone will give a smaller valuation to t. Let vi denote the
private valuation of drone ui. Then, vi can be expressed as
vi =
f ·t
li
.
Allocation Rule. The allocation rule g is used to determine
the winner drone ui based on the valuation, i.e., to find which
drone ui should be scheduled for charging. In the Myerson
auction, the allocation rule that awards the item to the highest
bidder is monotone. Therefore, in the proposed auction model,
the allocation rule g used to award the charging service to the
highest bidder is monotone. Therefore, the allocation rule can
be expressed as follows:
u∗ ∈ argmax
ui∈u
g(vi). (1)
Payment Rule. The payment rule p is used to determine the
payment by the winner drone ui based on the valuation. In
the proposed auction, the payment rule p chooses a payment
which is not higher than the private valuation, and it can be
5expressed as follows:
pi(vi) ∈ [0, xivi] (2)
where xi ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i = {1, . . . , U} stands for the variable to
represent the winning valuation in the auction, and u∗ is the
winner drone in the auction.
Reserve Price. The proposed auction sets a specific price
called a reserve price. The reserve price is the minimum reward
the seller accepts [11]. In this paper, the reserve price is set to
0. In the auction, the auctioneer solicits the private bids from
the bidders and computes the allocation rule g = (g1, . . . , gU )
and payment rule p = (p1, . . . , pU ).
Utility. The proposed auction guarantees DSIC and IR; and
thus each bidder reports truthfully to maximize its own utility.
Note that xi ∈ {0, 1} ,∀i = {1, . . . , U} stands for the variable
corresponding to the winning in the auction. If the drone wins
in auction, x is set to 1 whereas the x is set to 0 otherwise.
Thus, the utility of drone ui can be calculated as utility(ui) =
g(vi)− xi · pi(vi),∀i = {1, . . . , U}.
Revenue Optimal Auction Design. We define the virtual
valuation and virtual surplus as in Myerson [11]. The virtual
valuation φi(vi) of a buyer ui in the auction is a function used
to calculate the expected revenue of the auctioneer from that
buyer ui. The virtual surplus is the expected revenue excluding
the computing cost defined below. In Myerson auctions, each
bidder i has its own individual private valuation vi which is
drawn from the strictly increasing cumulative density function
Fi(vi) where the probability density function of vi is denoted
as fi(vi) [29], [30]. The virtual valuation of bidder i with
private valuation vi can be expressed as follows:
φi(vi) = vi − 1− Fi(vi)
fi(vi)
, (3)
There is a cost in computing the outcome c(g) which must
be payed by the auction [31]. Given valuation vi, virtual
valuation φi(vi), and allocation rule g, the virtual surplus can
be calculated as follows:∑
∀i φi(vi)xi − c(g). (4)
In Myerson auction, the expected payment is proportional
to the expected virtual surplus; and it can be computed as
follows [11], [31]:
Ebi [pi(bi)] = Ebi [φi(bi)xi(bi)]. (5)
Therefore, if the virtual valuations φ(b) are non-decreasing
in valuations b, the virtual surplus Eb is non-decreasing in
valuations b. The bid b is drawn from the distribution F (b)
with probability density function f(b). Then, the expected
payment can be computed as follows:
Eb[p(b)] =
∫ h
b=0
bg(b)f(b)db−
∫ h
b=0
g(b)[1− F (b)]db. (6)
=
∫ h
b=0
[
b− 1− F (b)
f(b)
]
g(b)f(b)db. (7)
= Eb[φ(b)g(b)]. (8)
As a result, the proposed auction approach, which consists
of a variant of the Myerson auction, is DSIC, IR, and revenue
Fig. 3: The proposed deep learning framework (revenue net-
work) for revenue-optimal auction computation.
optimal.
However, Myerson auctions require full knowledge of the
distributions F1, F2, . . . , FU according to Eq. (8). In the
considered scenario, it is hard to obtain such information a
priori, and we propose to use deep learning to estimate the
distributions. In previous research results, it has been shown
that the deep learning with limited structure can approximate
specific functions [15]–[17]. Specifically, herein, we use neural
networks and unsupervised learning [18], [19] to approximate
the virtual valuation function φ(v). The strength of deep
learning is that the approximated function can be continually
updated as inputs are acquired. The use of unsupervised
learning makes the learning process possible, as it does not
require the true values as input. The resulting auction is not
only easily applicable to the distributed multi-drone network
problem, but is also capable to adapt to continuously changing
environments.
IV. DEEP LEARNING BASED AUCTION DESIGN
In this section, a deep learning based method for single
item auctions is introduced. The method defines allocation
rule g, payment rule p, and virtual valuation function φ for
maximizing the revenue of the mobile charging station via
deep learning. The deep learning model constitutes the auction
that guarantees DSIC and IR as well as enables the revenue
optimal computation for auctioneer [18], [19]. The revenue
optimal auction can be configured through a relatively simple
deep learning structure, i.e., composed of max/min operations
and a loss function shaping the training process.
Theorem 1. (Myerson [11]). There exist a collection of
monotonically increasing functions φi: Vi → R, referred to
as the virtual valuation functions, for selling a single item in
the DSIC mechanism, which assigns the item to the buyer i
with the highest virtual value φi(vi) assuming this quantity is
positive and charges the winning bidder the smallest bid that
ensures that the bidder is winning.
As mentioned earlier, the proposed deep learning based
auction is a variant of Myerson auctions; and thus the bid
set b is transformed to the virtual valuation bi via virtual
valuation transformation. Specifically, as expressed in The-
orem 1, the bid set of bi,∀i = {1, . . . , U} are converted
to bi = φmononet(bi), i = {1, . . . , U}, where bi denotes
that the transformed bid of ui. In this procedure, the trained
deep network φmononet (a monotonic network) is utilized to
6replace the virtual valuation function φ. The φmononet consist
of two layers, and is composed of linear computation units
and min/max operation units. Based on the transformed bid
bi, the SPA with reserve price 0 (SPA-0) is performed. The
SPA-0 calculates the allocation probability and the payment
of the winner drone based on the rules (i.e., payment rule p
and allocation rule g) as follow:
Theorem 2. (Myerson [11]). For any set of strictly mono-
tonically increasing functions φ1, . . . , φU : R≥0 → R≥0, an
auction defined by the allocation rule gi = softmax(bi) and
payment rule pi = φ−1i (max
j 6=i
(φ(bi))) is DSIC and IR.
The φmononet should have non-decreasing monotone feature
when converting b into transformed bid b. Therefore, the
proposed deep learning network has a parameter constraint
and a specific structure so that the deep learning network can
be approximated to monotonic function via training process.
The used parameters for deep learning, i.e., weights and biases,
are positive. The structure of the network, shown in Fig 3, is
rather simple. The two layers network φmononet is represented
as φshared(φi(bi)),∀i = {1, . . . , U} [16], [18].
The assignment rule consist of the softmax operation
which has been used in deep learning based multimodal clas-
sification. The payment rules is composed of max operation
and ReLU. The ReLU makes the transformed bid bi which is
less than the reserve price of SPA-0 to be 0. The max unit is
used to make pi be the highest transformed bid except pi. The
results of ReLU and max unit are denoted by p. pi is the value,
before conversion to pi, which should be paid by the winner
drone ui. Note that pi can be larger than bi. Therefore, in a
IR auction, pi can not be the payment. Thus pi is converted
to pi via φ−1mononet. This process makes the result of deep
learning based auction to be IR when revenue optimal auction
is designed as shown in Fig 3. The φ−1mononet can be expressed
as φ−1shared(φ
−1
i (pi)),∀i = {1, . . . , U}. The computations of
φ−1shared and φ
−1
i is described as follows.
p′i = max
1≤g≤G
{
min
1≤n≤N
(wsharedg,n )
−1(pi − βsharedg,n )
}
(9)
pi = max
1≤g≤G
{
min
1≤n≤N
(wig,n)
−1(p′i − βig,n)
}
(10)
The two layers network φmononet constitutes the virtual
valuation function φ of Myerson auction, as shown in Fig 3.
In the φ−1mononet, it is important to reuse the weights from the
φmononet network as presented in (10) and (9). This forces
bi to be equal to φ−1mononet(φ
mononet(bi)) as in the case in
which the Myerson virtual valuation function is based on full
knowledge of the distribution F . The result of φ−1mononet is the
payment which should be paid by winner drone ui. Therefore,
the result pi is greater than the second highest bid of b and
smaller than the winning bid bi [11].
Additional networks are required to implement the rules in
overall auction processes. The deep learning networks used
in the proposed auction consist of three modular networks as
follows: (i) a network that can replace the virtual valuation
function φi of the Myerson auction, (ii) a network for the
allocation rule gi, and (iii) a network for the payment rule pi.
The above networks are optimized according to a loss function
via a training process. The loss function is essential to enable
the deep learning computation of the same structure to have
different characteristics [32], [33], and plays an important role
in deep learning.
Loss Function. In this paper, the negative expected virtual
surplus is used as a loss function where the virtual surplus
is equivalent to the revenue of the mobile charging station,
that is, the auctioneer and seller. The loss function is used to
train deep neural network parameters (weights and biases). The
deep neural network that configures a revenue-optimal auction
is composed of weights (denoted as w) and biases (denoted as
β) which replaces the virtual valuation function of Myerson.
Hhere, the deep neural network model automatically learns the
distribution, and fits its parameters to the actual distribution
of the data during the training process. The trained neural
networks are approximated by a virtual valuation function
which is based on fully distributed knowledge. The parameters
w and β of the deep neural network are trained through
unsupervised learning without ground truth information, i.e.,
the winner (which drone will be scheduled for charging) and
payment (how many the winner drone will pay). Therefore, the
results of the allocation and payment rules are used for training
parameters (i.e., ~w and ~β) can be explained as follows:
R
(
~w, ~β
)
= −
∑U
i=1
gi(bi) ∗ pi(bi) (11)
where the loss function (11) stands for the expected negative
revenue of auctioneer, i.e., the maximization of the expected
revenue of the auctioneer since the loss function should be
minimized eventually during the training procedure. Based on
the loss function, the benefit of the deep learning based auction
is seen in the training process. The proposed networks which
replace the virtual valuation function as well as auction rules
are optimized to DSIC, IR and the revenue optimal auction.
Deep Learning Training. The detailed training process of
the three networks are summarized in Algorithm 1, where,
based on the bid b, the payment and allocation probabilities are
calculated (line [4− 9]). R(w, β) is the loss function to guide
the deep learning network training. The negative expected
revenue is used as the loss function. The loss function can
be calculated by allocation probability g and payment p (line
[10]). The L2(w, β) is regularization factor which are used
to regularize the deep learning parameters (weights and bias)
(line [11]). The L2(w, β) regularization prevents parameters
from becoming excessively large. The training process is based
on unsupervised learning; and thus the allocation probability
and payment are the only required information. This means
that the environmental information such as distribution of
private valuation is not required. As a result, the proposed
deep learning network can be easily applied to mobile charging
stations. The parameters are determined by means of empirical
experiments as the payments of winners are updated sensi-
tively due to the weight range (line [15− 16]).
A. Deep Learning Networks
In this paper, the virtual valuation function is replaced by
the two layers network φmononet, composed of the monotonic
7Algorithm 1: Deep Learning Training
Input : k, U,B = {B1, . . . ,BT } where each input set
Bt , (b1, . . . , bU )
Output : Optimized weights w and β
Initialize: The network weights w and β using Xavier
initialization
1 while epoch r: 1→R do
2 while t : 1→ T do
3 Forward:
4 . b′i = φi(bi) = min
1≤g≤G
{
max
1≤n≤N
(wig,nbi + β
i
g,n)
}
;
5 . bi = φshared(b
′
i);
6 . gi = softmax
(
b1, . . . , bU ; k
)
= e
kbi∑U
j=1 e
kbj
;
7 . pi = ReLU
{
maxj 6=i(bi)
}
;
8 . p′i = φ
−1
shared(pi);
9 . pi = φ
−1
i (p
′
i) =
max
1≤g≤G
{
min
1≤n≤N
(wig,n)
−1(p′i − βig,n)
}
;
10 . Compute the expected negative revenue
R(w, β) = −∑Ui=1 gi(bi) ∗ pi(bi);
11 . Compute L2 weight loss
L2(w, β) =
∑U
i=1
∑G
g=1
∑N
n=1
{
(wig,n)
2 + (βig,n)
2
}
;
12 . Compute Loss(w, β) = R(w, β) + L2(w, β)
13 Optimize:
14 . Update ~w and ~β for minimizing Cost(w, β);
15 . Clip ~w (minB,max∞);
16 . Clip ~β (min 0,max∞);
17 end
18 end
networks.
Monotonic Network. As shown in Fig 3, the monotonic
network is a three-layer deep neural network. The input layer
is configured with multiple groups composed of sets of linear
units. The maximum value of each group is calculated in the
second layer. The last layer selects the minimum value of
the given output of the second layer. As the name suggests,
the monotonic network is monotonic, and this characteristic is
preserved regardless of the number of groups, units, and the
order of min/max operations.
Virtual Valuation Network. The virtual valuation function in
the Myerson auction is replaced with the monotonic network.
The computation of φshared and φi is implemented as follows.
bi = φ
shared
i (b
′
i) = min
1≤g≤G
{
max
1≤n≤N
(wsharedg,n b
′
i + β
shared
g,n )
}
(12)
b′i = φi(bi) = min
1≤g≤G
{
max
1≤n≤N
(wig,nbi + β
i
g,n)
}
(13)
The bid bi of the drone ui is transformed to bi via the virtual
valuation network φmononet. In the φmononet, all outcomes of
φshared are calculated on the same weights, whereas the φi
calculates the outcome using different weights for each bid.
The inverse computation of φmononet is denoted by φ−1mononet.
The φ−1mononet that determines the payment of the winner drone
ui which is composed of two networks. In the computation
of φ−1mononet, the weights of φ
mononet are used. Thus the
computations of two layers can be expressed as follows:
p′i = φ
−1
shared(pi) = max1≤g≤G
{
min
1≤n≤N
(wsharedg,n )
−1(pi − βsharedg,n )
}
(14)
pi = φ
−1
i (p
′
i) = max
1≤g≤G
{
min
1≤n≤N
(wig,n)
−1(p′i − βig,n)
}
(15)
The payment pi of the drone ui is transformed to pi via the
φ−1mononet. The φ
−1
mononet consists of φ
−1
i and φ
−1
shared. The
same weights are used to calculate all outcomes of φ−1shared.
The outcome of φ−1i is calculated based on different weights
for each bid, as shown in (15).
The monotonic network is responsible for the transforma-
tion of the virtual bid bi in auction. As mentioned above, the
optimal revenue is equivalent to the optimal virtual surplus.
Thus, the monotonic network is major component of the
auction. However, in order to configure the revenue-optimal
auction, the additional network by allocation and payment
rules is required. In this paper, the payment and allocation
rules are configured with ReLU and softmax which have
been mainly used in deep learning as an activation function.
This makes backpropagation easy during the training process.
Allocation Rule Network (gi). This section describes in
more details the structure of the allocation rules (gi). In this
paper, since this allocation rule is implemented using a deep
neural network, the probability is calculated using softmax
which converts the input vector into a probability vector. The
allocation rule g awards the charging service to the highest
bidder drone; and thus the highest probability is assigned to the
highest bidder. The continuous function (2) traditional auction
is approximated using the deep network, which converts the
input vector b to the probability vector. In the SPA auction with
reserve price 0 (SPA-0), the allocation rule assigns the highest
winning probability to the highest bidder whose transformed
bid bi is greater than 0, bi > 0. The softmax based
assignment can be calculated as follows:
gi = softmax
(
b1, . . . , bU ; k
)
=
ekbi∑U
j=1 e
kbj
. (16)
The parameter k is a constant value and it determines the
quality of the approximation. As the k increases, the quality
of the approximation increases, whereas the smoothness in the
allocation network decreases. For simplicity, this means that
the higher k makes a large difference between the allocation
probabilities of users [18]. When the networks are trained to
minimize (11), the value of gi(bi) increases. As a result, since
the profit of the auctioneer is related to the second highest
gi(bi), it is also a function of the parameter k. Results in
Sec. V) show how larger values of k lead to higher profits.
Payment Rule Network (pi). This section describes the
structure of the allocation rule (pi). The ReLU is widely used
in deep learning computation as an activation function. In the
proposed auction, the payment pi of drone ui is calculated
from the transformed bid bi. Before the computation of
φ−1mononet, the deep network excludes the bid below the reserve
price 0 via ReLU(bi) , max(bi, 0). The input bi is the second
highest transformed bid which is the output of maxj 6=i
(
bi
)
.
The payment rule network can be, then, calculated as:
pi = ReLU
{
max
j 6=i
(
bi
)}
(17)
and the result pi is used as an input of (9), i.e., the actual
8Algorithm 2: Deep Learning-Based Algorithm for the
Auction Controlling the Charging Scheduling
Input : t, f , Bid sets b , (b1, . . . , bU )
Output: allocation probability set gi , (g1, . . . , gU ),
payment set pi , (p1, . . . , pU )
1 while Mobile charging system is idle do
2 . Drones: charging scheduling valuation vi;
3 . Drones: submit bid bi;
4 . b′i = φi(bi) = min
1≤g≤G
{
max
1≤n≤N
(wig,nbi + β
i
g,n)
}
;
5 . bi = φshared(b
′
i);
6 . gi = softmax
(
b1, . . . , bU ; k
)
= e
kbi∑U
j=1 e
kbj
;
7 . pi = ReLU
{
maxj 6=i(bi)
}
;
8 . p′i = φ
−1
shared(pi);
9 . pi = φ
−1
i (p
′
i) = max
1≤g≤G
{
min
1≤n≤N
(wig,n)
−1(p′i − βig,n)
}
;
10 . Calculate winner and payment (gk, pk);
11 . Winner Drone: Pay payment;
12 . Allocate charging system to the winner;
13 end
TABLE II: Revenue changes by k, U (in Fig.4a-4c)
SPA k = 1 k = 3 k = 5
5 drones 4.7532 7.0001 7.0121 7.1009
10 drones 5.8493 7.0345 7.1408 7.2235
15 drones 7.4829 8.0912 8.6038 8.6471
payment of winner drone.
B. Overall Auction Mechanism
The overall deep learning-based auction mechanism is
summarized in Algorithm 2. If the mobile charging system
becomes idle, the auction is initiated (line [1]). The valuation
vi for the charging time is computed by each drone ui based on
its own private criteria. Then, based on the individual private
valuation, each drone submits its bid bi (line [2 − 3]). The
mobile charging station runs the auction using the pre-trained
networks. If p = 0, then all the drones assign a low valuation
to the charging time and the mobile charging system does not
allocate the charging time to users. If there exist bids which are
larger than reserve price 0, the corresponding allocation and
payment probabilities are calculated using the proposed deep
learning networks, i.e., virtual valuation network, allocation
network, and payment network (line [4 − 10]). Because the
proposed deep learning auction is the variant of SPA-0, any bid
below the reserve price 0 is converted to 0 (line [7]). As shown
in line [11], the mobile charging station assigns the payment
of pi to the drone ui with the highest gi. Finally, the mobile
charging station allocates the charging time to the winner
drone ui (line [12]). The drone, then, reaches the charging
station and occupy it for the duration of the slot. After the
winner drone leaves the charging station, next iteration starts
if the mobile station is idle.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Software Prototype. First, we describe the software developed
to test the auction mechanism. The Xavier initializer was
TABLE III: Parameters
Variables Descriptions
The number of drones 5, 10, 15
Learning rate 0.0001
L2 regularization parameter 0.001
Training set size 100000 bid sets
Simulation epoch 100
Approximate quality k 1, 3, 5
Distribution of li U[1:5], U[5:10], U[1:10]
Weight range B 0.0001
used for weight value initialization, where the biases were
initialized as 0. As mentioned earlier, L2 regularization is
used to prevent excessive parameter growth during training
and reduce overfitting. The regularization factor was set to
0.001. During the training phase, the Adam [34] optimizer
was us to iteratively. This choice is motivated by the need
to keep separated the learning rates for each weight. An
exponentially decaying average of previous gradients was used
for iteration-based optimization. In the experiments, different
uniform distributions were used for data generation, as shown
in Table III. Data-intensive evaluation was conducted with
100, 000 generated data sets. Among the data sets, 70% of sets
were used for training; and the remaining 30% were used for
testing. The proposed deep learning-based auction mechanism
was implemented in Python/TensorFlow [35] and Keras [36].
A multi-GPU platform (equipped with 2 NVIDIA Titan XP
GPUs using 1405 MHz main clock and 12 GB memory) was
used for training and testing.
Experimental Setting. The test environment includes 5, 10,
or 15 drones. During performance evaluation, the parameter
k is determined to control the quality of approximation. First,
we compare the proposed model with SPA-0 with a priori
knowledge to demonstrate revenue-optimality. Results show
the ability of the proposed deep learning-based approach to
adapt to different scenarios. The valuation results of drones are
generated based on various distributions as defined in Table III.
Table III summarizes the used parameters.
Revenue Analysis - Parameter k. The proposed framework
is based on the Myerson optimal auction, which produces an
increased revenue to the mobile charging station compared to
SPA-0 auctions. The experiments shown in Fig. 4 confirm this
effect, and illustrate the effect of the parameter k. Fig. (4a)-
(4c) show a comparison between the revenue of the mobile
charging station – the auctioneer – as a function of the
parameter k defined in (16). In the experiments, the bid set is
uniformly generated in the range of 0− 10. The bid is calcu-
lated based on the private valuation as discussed in Sec. III.
The value of system parameters, such as battery consumption
rate, and weight, is also assumed to be uniformly distributed.
The results in Fig.(4a)-(4c) show that the revenue increases
as the k increases. The numerical results are presented in the
Table II. The revenue gap between the SPA-0 and the proposed
auction when the number of drone is 5 is near 2.25 when
k = 1, near 2.26 when k = 3 and about 2.35 when k = 5.
The mobile charging station can take the highest revenue, i.e.,
the case where k = 5. This result shows that the revenue of
mobile charging station increases in the order of SPA − 0,
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Fig. 5: Revenue analysis.
k = 1, k = 3 and k = 5. The parameter k determines
not only the approximation quality of softmax function but
also the revenue of charging station. In Fig. 4, the number of
drones which participate in the proposed charging scheduling
auction is updated. In general, more drones participate in
auction, the higher the bid can be submitted to the auction
with high probability; and thus the second highest bid value
of the auction can be increased while the number of drones
increases. Note that the revenue of auctioneer is equivalent
to the payment of user. Therefore, the payment of winner
drone increases. As a result, the revenue of mobile charging
station becomes larger. In the SPA-0, the revenue is increased
from 4.7532 to 5.8493 when the number of drones increases
from 5 to 10. Similarly, the revenue of proposed charging
scheduling auction increases to 7.0345 when k = 1, 7.1408
when k = 3 and 7.2235 when k = 5. This tendency is
maintained when the number of drones increases from 10 to
15, as shown in (Fig.4a-4c). Fig. 4d and Table. II shows the
revenue of k = 3 model when the number of drones increases
from 5 to 15. In this evaluation, the training of deep learning
network uses the pre-trained weights. Based on this experi-
ment result, we can confirm that the proposed deep learning
auction provides higher revenue to mobile charging system
when the number of drones increases. In Fig.4, the horizontal
axis of the experiment means the iteration of the proposed
deep learning network training. The convergence of the deep
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Fig. 6: Payment comparison among drones.
TABLE IV: Revenue statistics (in Fig. 5a)
SPA k = 1 k = 3
Mean 8.0536 8.0548 8.6032
Top 25 percentile 6.6003 6.6081 7.1733
Top 75 percentile 9.0358 9.0372 9.3873
TABLE V: Revenue of mobile charging station (in Fig. 5b)
Case (1) (2) (3) (4) (7)
SPA 7.5585 7.7175 6.1124 6.4550 5.7769
k = 1 7.7392 7.8891 6.2405 6.5808 5.9459
k = 3 7.9419 9.5227 8.8311 9.5005 9.9011
learning networks during small number of iteration shows high
adaptability to specific applications. Fig.(4a-4c) show that the
proposed deep learning-based auction can achieve stability in
approximately 300 iterations. Fig. 4d shows that the stability
can be achieved much faster when the pre-trained network
is used. This results mean that the proposed deep learning
based auction has high adaptability; and thus it can be applied
to the various environment with partial knowledge valuation
distribution as presented in Sec. III. In Fig.4, the results show
that the proposed auction guarantees the increased revenue of
mobile charging station over SPA-0 and has a highly adaptive
algorithm under partial knowledge distribution (a.k.a., not fully
distributed knowledge).
Statistical Analysis (Parameter k). In this section, we show
the case where the penalty given to participant who bids a false
bid. We confirm that the proposed method imposes penalty
on the false bidder. In addition, the experimental results
shows that how the penalty varies depending on k values.
In Fig. 4, the effect of parameter k can be observed while
the number of drones varies. Fig. 5 shows that the statistics
analysis of revenue values for difference k values in (16)
and SPA-0 when the number of drones does not vary. The
experiment results compare the average revenue, maximum
revenue, minimum revenue, top 25 percentile, and top 75
percentile. The evaluation uses the deep learning networks
when the k values are 1 and 3. As k increases, the gap between
the average revenue of model and the average revenue of
SPA-0 get larger as shown in Fig. 5a and Table. IV. When
the proposed model is k = 1, the revenue average is 8.0548,
similar to the revenue average of SPA-0. However, when the
k value of model is 3, the revenue average is 8.6032; and thus
the model gets near 7% higher revenue average than SPA-
0. When k = 1, the gap between the proposed model and
SPA-0 is near 0.008 in terms of top 25 percentile whereas
the gap is about 0.57, when k = 3. In addition, in terms of
top 75 percentile, the revenue of k = 3 model is about 0.3
larger than k = 1 model and SPA-0. This result shows that the
proposed model with large k takes higher revenue. Therefore,
we can confirm that the revenue of mobile charging station
declines in the order of k = 3, k = 1, and SPA-0. In Fig. 5b,
the graph shows the 10 results of validation experiments, i.e.,
10 cases are considered in the validation experiments. The
number on the X-axis in Fig. 5b represents the indices of
individual cases. The result stands for the revenue of mobile
charging station via deep learning auction. We can confirm
that the revenue with k = 1 is always smaller than the one
with k = 3. The gap between the k = 1 and k = 3 models is
about 0.2 in Case 1; and the Case 1 is the minimum, whereas
the maximum gap is about 5 in Case 7 as shown in Table V.
The revenue with k = 1 is larger than the SPA-0, but similar
to SPA-0. The gap between the k = 1 and SPA-0 is 0.13 in
Case 4; and the Case is the minimum. The maximum gap is
about 0.18 in Case 1. This experiments also show that the gap
between the results by the two models with k = 1/k = 3 and
the results of SPA-0 are not always equivalent. For example,
the gap between k = 1 and k = 3 models is near 0.2 in Case
1m however near 1.7 in Case 2. This is due to the fact that
the transformation depends on the weight of φi; and thus the
transformation via φmononet is not applied equally to the same
bids. This means that if b1 = 2 and also b3 = 2, these two
bids can be transformed differently. Therefore, the payment
is not always equivalent. This means that the proposed deep
learning auction adapts to the bid distribution at the time of
the auction procedure, giving the mobile charging station high
revenue. It can be seen that higher revenue is guaranteed by
increasing the value of parameter k.
The proposed deep learning based auction algorithm has a
strength in terms of giving penalty to false bidder. In Fig. 6,
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TABLE VI: Payment of drone (in Fig. 6a)
False Rate 0.8 1.2 1.6 2.0
SPA (6a) 8.6177 8.6177 8.6177 8.6177
k = 1 (6a) 11.2161 17.8814 24.3196 32.4915
k = 3 (6a) 11.3513 18.5424 25.1623 33.8989
k = 1 (6b) 130.15% 207.49% 282.20% 377.03%
k = 3 (6b) 131.72% 215.16% 291.98% 393.36%
experiment results present the payment of drone when the
drone submits bid falsely (i.e., fake bid). This experiment
conducts with the models of k = 1 and k = 3. The experiment
assumes that the number of drones which participate in auction
is 5. The truth valuation of drone which submits the bid falsely
is set to 15.9835. The bid values of the other drones are
generated by uniform distribution. This experiment uses the
scenario where 5 drones exist and one is with fake bid and
the other four are with truthful bids. In Fig. 6a, the second
highest bid is set to 8.6177 as shown in Table VI. This result
shows that a drone cannot win the auction when it bids up to
0.2 − 0.8 times larger than the true valuation 15.9835. As a
result, the drone is defeated in the auction due to false bid.
On the other hand, when a drone submits bid as 1.2−2 times
larger than true valuation, the fake bid leads to win in auction.
However, the fake bid increases the payment in the fake-bid
drone. For example, if the drone submits near 40 bid falsely
in the SPA-based auction, the drone can only pay about 8.4.
However, the payment is 32.4915 in the proposed auction with
k = 1. This means that the bidding of drone which falsely
submit the bid for getting charging increases the payment. In
addition, the payment increases when the k value of models
increases. Table VI also shows the payment increment while
k increases. The increased payment of the proposed model is
at least 30% greater than that of the auction using SPA-0 as
shown in Table VI. When the drone submits true valuation,
the payment is just about 50% higher than the SPA-0 auction.
However, if the bid is 1.2 times larger than the true valuation,
the payment is about 200% larger than the SPA-0 auction. This
experiment shows that if drone submits false bid for winning
the auction, the drone gets a loss in terms of the payment; and
thus the loss let the drone avoid fake bidding.
Fig. (7a) shows the proposed deep learning based auction
can be trained through transfer learning when the distribution
of bid values varies. The dotted lines are revenue when the
SPA-0 is executed. The red and blue lines stand for the revenue
when the proposed algorithm is used. The revenue is higher
than SPA-0 as shown in previous experiments. The proposed
model is stabilized with 400 training iterations if training
starts from the initialized model. If the training starts from
the trained model (i.e., transfer learning), the proposed model
is stabilized with approximately 100 training iterations when
the bid distribution varies. This experiment shows that the
proposed model adapts to the change of the bid distribution
and can provide reasonable results at various distribution. In
Fig. (7b), we consider the flight energy consumption of drones
in this experiment as follows [37], [38].
E(t) = (β + αz) · t+ Pmax
(z
s
)
(18)
where α is a motor speed multiplier, β is the minimum power
needed to hover just over the ground (when altitude is almost
zero), z means the height at time step t, and s is the speed
of drone and Pmax is the maximum power of motor to flight.
Therefore, the term Pmax( zs ) refers to the power consumption
needed to lift to height h with speed v [37], [38]. In this
experiment, we set the values of α to 5.5, β to 15, z to 1m,
and Pmax to 45. Fig. (7b) shows that the number of drones
discharged from battery. In this experiment, we assumed that
the charging service fully charges the battery of the drones
which wins in the auction. The charging service is only for
1 time slot. Therefore, the drones consume 65.5mAh per 1
time step (1 hour) and recharge 1000mAh when recharged.
In this experiment, we assume that 15 drones exist and they
want to constantly join the charging service scheduling. In
Fig. (7b), when the proposed deep learning auction is used
to schedule charging services, 11 of the 15 drones can be
charged without being discharged. This experiment shows that
the proposed method can increase the drone flight time in
multi-drone networks.
Deep Learning Model Characteristics. These experimental
results explain why monotonic network is considered as the
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Fig. 9: φshared(b′i) changes according to drone’s valuation.
baseline structure of the proposed deep learning auction archi-
tecture. In the proposed auction, when bids are transformed to
virtual values through the monotonic network, the order of
bids must be maintained. For example, if the bid b1 of user
u1 is larger than the bid b2 of user u2, converted b1 must be
larger than b2. The corresponding experimental results show
that the monotonic network performs the transformation that
maintains the order. Fig. 8 shows the transformed value which
is the result of virtual valuation function φi when the bid of
the winner drone and the second highest bid increase from
1 to 10. The fixed weights of the φi were used when the
winning bid and the second highest bid were transformed
because the weights are continuously updated during deep
learning training process. For this experiment, the networks
are trained when the winning bid is 7.48292044, the second
highest bid is 4.75319804, and other bids are generated along
the uniform distribution. In Fig. 8a, the transformed value p′i
of the second highest bid is higher than the one of winning
bid. This tendency can be shown in Fig. 8b and Fig. 8c. By
comparing the Fig. 8a and Fig. 8b, it can be observed that the
transformed bid decreases as the number of drones increases.
However, through Fig. 8b and Fig. 8c, we can confirm that the
transformed value b′i is independent to the number of drones.
Instead of the number of drones, the weights are affected by
the allocation probability and payment of other bids because
the loss function is configured based on the allocation rule
and payment rule. Fig. 8 also shows the φi network conducts
non-decreasing monotonic transformation. Therefore, the φi
network is able to replace φ function in Myerson auction
because the φi network performs a monotonic transformation.
In Fig. 9, the changes of φshared(φi(bi)) is presented when
the bid of the winner drone and the second highest bid increase
from 1 to 10. The fixed weights of the φshared were also used.
The deep learning network is trained when the winning bid is
7.48292044, the second highest bid is 4.75319804, and other
bids are generated along the uniform distribution similar to the
evaluation for Fig. 8. It can be seen that the result of φshared
is larger than the one of the φi shown in Fig. 8 because the
computation of φshared is conducted based on the result of
the φi as well as the φshared does non-decreasing monotonic
transformation. Through comparison of Fig. 9a and Fig. 9b,
it can be seen that the result of φshared decreases when the
number of drones increases, as shown in Fig. 8. However, in
Fig. 9c, it can be observed that the result of φshared with
15 drones becomes larger than the one of φshared with 10
drones. Therefore, this experiment shows that the weights are
affected by the allocation probability and payment and they
are independent to the number of drones. The transformed
bid pi of the second highest bid is larger than the one of
the winning bid. The tendency which is shown in Fig. 8 is
maintained. The φi network has independent weights per input
data. That is, if there are 5 inputs, there are 5 φi networks, and
all learning networks have different weights. However, φshared
network is just one network regardless of the number of inputs.
If there are 5 inputs, only one φshared network exists. Through
Fig. 8 and Fig. 9, it can be observed that the non-decreasing
monotonic feature of φi networks and φshared are trained by
the limited network structure and the loss function regardless
of whether the weights are shared or not.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE WORK
The proposed deep learning based auction is revenue op-
timal for mobile charging scheduling in distributed multi-
drone networks. In this paper, the mobile charging scheduling
problem is interpreted as auction problem where each drone
bids its own valuation and then the charging station schedules
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drones based on it in terms of revenue-optimality. Through the
proposed deep-learning based solution approach, the charging
auction enables efficient scheduling by automatically learn-
ing the required knowledge (i.e., bids distribution), which
is required in conventional auction mechanisms. Therefore,
environmental information is not required anymore in auction
computation. This makes effective troubleshooting possible in
distributed multi-drone networks. The proposed algorithm only
requires payment and allocation probabilities by the multi-
drones. The loss function in deep learning computation is an
important factor that allows the proposed auction to be con-
structed based on environment independent information. As
verified via software prototype based performance evaluation,
following facts are observed: (i) guaranteeing optimal revenue
in terms of individual rationality and dominant strategy in-
centive compatibility, (ii) limiting the false bids of drones
by increasing the payment to the false-bid drones, and (iii)
enabling a revenue optimal auction to be constructed without
complex prior knowledge, i.e., bids distribution.
As future research directions, advanced auction mechanism
designs with multiple mobile charging stations are worthy to
consider. In this case, the problem can be formulated with
multi-item auction and then the corresponding mathematical
formulation, verification, and analysis are desired. Further-
more, the proposed deep learning-based auction mechanisms
can be advantageous in various applications. For example,
visual attention is considerable because it can be reformulated
as resource allocation [39]–[42].
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